Competition in data-based service provision: Nash equilibrium characterization

[EN] This paper analyzes the economic feasibility of a market for data-based services, which is a scenario envisioned in sectors that are adopting Internet of Things and/or Big Data technologies. A business model for the provision of a data-based service is proposed. In this model, service providers build services from data that is collected and sold by data providers in a market, and provide services to final users. Service providers compete strategically against each other in the data market and in the service market. The strategic interaction between the service providers is analyzed by means of non-cooperative game theory. A thorough mathematical analysis of the Nash equilibria is carried out and existence and uniqueness conditions are proved and discussed. We conclude that if the sensitivity of users to the data-rate-to-price ratio is above the unity and the number of service provider does not exceed a given limit, a unique and meaningful equilibrium exists. We also conclude that the intensity of competition is beneficial for the users and detrimental for the service providers, while for the data providers, maximum surplus is obtained in an intermediate intensity of competition. Finally, an increase in the users¿ sensitivity to the data-rate-to-price ratio causes a shift on the surplus from both the service providers and data providers to the users.This work has been supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through project TIN2013-47272-C2-1-R.Guijarro, L.; Pla, V.; Vidal Catalá, JR.; Naldi, M. (2019). Competition in data-based service provision: Nash equilibrium characterization. Future Generation Computer Systems. 96:35-50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2019.01.04435509

Game Theoretical Analysis of Service Provision for the Internet of Things Based on Sensor Virtualization

[EN] The advent of the Internet of Things (IoT) is expected to bring major benefits to a wide range of areas. However, the successful deployment of the IoT calls for the existence of sustainable and well-understood business models. In this paper, we propose and analyze a business model for a likely scenario in the IoT, which is made up of WSNs, service providers and users. The service providers compete against each other in the intermediation between the virtualized WSNs and the users that benefit from enhanced services built on the sensed data. The service providers pay to the WSNs for the data and charge the users for the service. The model is analyzed by applying oligopoly theory and game theory, the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium are established, and the equilibrium and the social optimum are obtained. Our results show that the business model is sustainable, provided that the users¿ sensitivity to the value-to-price ratio is not negligible and, in this situation, the number of active service providers is upper bounded by a value that depends on the sensitivity and the market size. Furthermore, the operation of such a market is shown to efficiently use the information provided by the WSNs, and, when compared to the social optimum, to produce an increase in users¿ and service providers¿ surpluses, but a reduction in WSNs¿ surplus.This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness under Project TIN2013-47272-C2-1-R.Guijarro, L.; Pla, V.; Vidal Catalá, JR.; Naldi, M. (2017). Game Theoretical Analysis of Service Provision for the Internet of Things Based on Sensor Virtualization. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications. 35(3):691-706. https://doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2672239S69170635

Maximum-Profit Two-Sided Pricing in Service Platforms Based on Wireless Sensor Networks

(c) 2015 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other users, including reprinting/ republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted components of this work in other works.A business model for Internet-of-Things-based services is proposed whereby a platform serves as an intermediary between human users and wireless sensor networks (WSNs). The platform, acting as a monopolist, posts both the price paid by each user and the price paid to each WSN so as to maximize its profits. In this setting, we propose, analyze, and compare two alternative payment schemes for the WSN side. We demonstrate that the two payment schemes are equivalent from every stakeholder s point of view. And then we show that there is a user cost ceiling, which depends both on the number of WSNs and the strength of the cross externality that the WSNs creates on the users, below which the take-up is maximum.This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through project TIN2013-47272-C2-1-R.Guijarro, L.; Pla, V.; Vidal Catalá, JR.; Naldi, M. (2016). Maximum-Profit Two-Sided Pricing in Service Platforms Based on Wireless Sensor Networks. IEEE Wireless Communications Letters. 5(1):8-11. https://doi.org/10.1109/LWC.2015.2487259S8115

Economic Analysis of a Multi-Sided Platform for Sensor-Based Services in the Internet of Things

[EN] A business model for sensor-based services is proposed where a platform creates a multi-sided market. The business model comprises a platform that serves as an intermediary between human users, app developers, and sensor networks, so that the users use the apps and the apps process the data supplied by the sensor networks. The platform, acting as a monopolist, posts a fee for each of the three sides so as to maximize its profit. This business model intends to mimic the market-creating innovation that main mobile apps platforms have generated in the smartphone sector. We conduct an analysis of the profit maximization problem faced by the platform, show that optimum prices exist for any parameter value, and show that these prices always induce an equilibrium in the number of agents from each side that join the platform. We show that the relative strength of the value that advertisers attach to the users determines the platform price structure. Depending on the value of this relative strength, two alternative subsidizing strategies are feasible: to subsidize either the users¿ subscription or the developers¿ registration. Finally, all agents benefit from an increase in the population at any of the three sides. This result provides a rationale for incentivizing not only the user participation, but also the entry of developer undertakings and the deployment of wireless sensor network infrastructure.This work has been supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Project TIN2013-47272-C2-1-R (co-supported by the European Social Fund) and by Institute ITACA-UPVthrough "Convocatorias Ayudas 2019-5"Guijarro, L.; Vidal Catalá, JR.; Pla, V.; Naldi, M. (2019). Economic Analysis of a Multi-Sided Platform for Sensor-Based Services in the Internet of Things. Sensors. 19(2):1-23. https://doi.org/10.3390/s19020373S12319

Performance Study and Enhancement of Access Barring for Massive Machine-Type Communications

[EN] Machine-type communications (MTC) is an emerging technology that boosts the development of the Internet of Things by providing ubiquitous connectivity and services. Cellular networks are an excellent choice for providing such hyper-connectivity thanks to their widely deployed infrastructure, among other features. However, dealing with a large number of connection requests is a primary challenge in the cellular-based MTC. Severe congestion episodes can occur when a large number of devices try to access the network almost simultaneously. Extended access barring (EAB) is a congestion control mechanism for the MTC that has been proposed by the 3GPP. In this paper, we carry out a thorough performance analysis of the EAB and show the limitations of its current specification. To overcome these limitations, we propose the two enhanced EAB schemes: the combined use of the EAB and access class barring, and the introduction of a congestion avoidance backoff after the barring status of a UE is switched to unbarred. It is shown through extensive simulations that our proposed solutions improve the key performance indicators. A high successful access probability can be achieved even in heavily congested scenarios, the access delay is shortened, and, most importantly, the number of required preamble retransmissions is reduced, which results in significant energy savings. Furthermore, we present an accurate congestion estimation method that solely relies on the information available at the base station. We show that this method permits a realistic and effective implementation of the EAB.This work was supported in part by the Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovacion y Universidades (MCIU), Agencia Estatal de Investigacion (AEI) y Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional (FEDER), UE, under Grant PGC2018-094151-B-I00, and in part by the ITACA Institute under Grant Ayudas ITACA 2019Vidal Catalá, JR.; Tello-Oquendo, L.; Pla, V.; Guijarro, L. (2019). Performance Study and Enhancement of Access Barring for Massive Machine-Type Communications. IEEE Access. 7:63745-63759. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2917618S6374563759

Competition in Service Provision between Slice Operators in 5G Networks

[EN] Network slicing is gaining an increasing importance as an effective way to introduce flexibility in the management of resources in 5G networks. We envision a scenario where a set of network operators outsource their respective networks to one Infrastructure Provider (InP), and use network slicing mechanisms to request the resources as needed for service provision. The InP is then responsible for the network operation and maintenance, while the network operators become Virtual Network Operators (VNOs). We model a setting where two VNOs compete for the users in terms of quality of service, by strategically distributing its share of the aggregated cells capacity managed by the InP among its subscribers. The results show that the rate is allocated among the subscribers at each cell in a way that mimics the overall share that each VNO is entitled to, and that this allocation is the Nash equilibrium of the strategic slicing game between the VNOs. We conclude that network sharing and slicing provide an attractive flexibility in the allocation of resources without the need to enforce a policy through the InP.This work has been supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through project TIN2013-47272-C2-1- R (cosupported by the European Social Fund) and by Institute ITACA-UPV through “Convocatorias Ayudas 2018-5”.Guijarro, L.; Vidal Catalá, JR.; Pla, V. (2018). Competition in Service Provision between Slice Operators in 5G Networks. Electronics. 7(11):1-10. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics7110315S11071

Femtocell operator entry decision with spectrum bargaining and service competition

This paper analyzes the effect of the entry of a femtocell operator into a mobile communications market where a macrocell operator exists. The analysis is conducted using a game-theory-based model, specifically a threelevel multi leaderfollower game, where different solution concepts are applied: Shapley value, Nash equilibrium and Wardrop equilibrium. It aims to answer the question of which benefit mobile communication users get from the entry of a femtocell operator into the market. The equilibrium is assessed from the point of view of each agent (e.g. profits and utilities), and of the whole (e.g. social welfare). A case for regulatory intervention is made. © 1997-2012 IEEE.This work has been supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through project TIN2010-21378-C02-02.Guijarro Coloma, LA.; Pla, V.; Vidal Catalá, JR.; Martínez Bauset, J. (2012). Femtocell operator entry decision with spectrum bargaining and service competition. IEEE Communications Letters. 16(12):1976-1979. https://doi.org/10.1109/LCOMM.2012.101712.121645S19761979161

Restriccion de Acceso Extendida para Manejar Despliegues Masivos de ¿ Comunicaciones Tipo Maquina (mMTC)

[ES] La comunicacion masiva tipo m ¿ aquina (mMTC) ha presentado un momento promete- ¿ dor para generar conexiones potentes y ubicuas que enfrentan muchos desaf¿¿os nuevos. Las redes celulares son la solucion potencial debido a su amplio despliegue de in- ¿ fraestructura, confiabilidad, seguridad y eficiencia. En las redes mMTC basadas en comunicacion celular, el canal de acceso aleatorio se utiliza para establecer la conexi ¿ on¿ entre los dispositivos MTC y las estaciones base (eNBs), donde el principal desaf¿¿o es la conectividad escalable y eficiente para una enorme cantidad de dispositivos. Para hacer frente a esto, el Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) ha sugerido la restriccion de acceso extendida (EAB) como un mecanismo para el control de la con- ¿ gestion. Las eNBs activan o desactivan EAB utilizando un coeficiente de congesti ¿ on. En ¿ este documento se presenta un enfoque para implementar el coeficiente de congestion¿ de modo que EAB pueda operar y as¿¿ manejar los episodios de congestion en escenarios ¿ de mMTC. Tambien se examina el rendimiento de EAB bajo diferentes cargas de tr ¿ afico ¿ de MTC y configuraciones de ciclo de paginacion en t ¿ erminos de indicadores clave de ¿ rendimiento de la red (KPIs). Los resultados numericos demuestran la efectividad del ¿ metodo propuesto para detectar episodios de congesti ¿ on. Adem ¿ as se demuestra que el ¿ aumento del valor de la configuracion del ciclo de paginaci ¿ on influye en el compor- ¿ tamiento de la red bajo EAB.[EN] Massive machine type communication (mMTC) has presented a promising moment to generate powerful and ubiquitous connections that face plenty of new challenges. Cellular networks are the potential solution owing to their extensive infrastructure deployment, reliability, security, and efficiency. In cellular-based mMTC networks, the random access channel is used to establish the connection between MTC devices and base stations (eNBs), where the scalable and efficient connectivity for a tremendous number of devices is the primary challenge. To deal with this, the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has suggested the extended access barring (EAB) as a mechanism for congestion control. The eNBs activate or deactivate EAB using a congestion coefficient. In this paper, an approach to implementing the congestion coefficient is presented so that EAB can operate thus handling congestion episodes in mMTC scenarios. Moreover, the performance of EAB is examined under different MTC traffic loads and paging cycle configurations concerning network key performance indicators (KPIs). Numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method to detect congestion episodes. Also, it is shown that increasing the value of the paging cycle configuration influence on the network behavior under EAB.This work was supported in part by the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness of Spain under Grants TIN2013-47272-C2-1-R and TEC2015- 71932-REDT.Tello-Oquendo, L.; Vidal Catalá, JR.; Pla, V.; Martínez Bauset, J. (2018). Extended Access Barring for Handling Massive Machine Type Communication (mMTC) Deployments. NOVASINERGIA. 1(2):38-44. http://hdl.handle.net/10251/121752S38441

Competition and bargaining in wireless networks with spectrum leasing

The case for a competitive market operated by a Mobile Network Operator (MNO) and a Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) is analysed in the paper. The resource that is leased by the MNO to the MVNO is spectrum. The MNO and the MVNO compete `a la Bertrand posting subscription prices and the mobile users may choose to subscribe to one operator. The scenario is modeled by a three-level game comprising a bargaining game, which models the spectrum leasing by the MNO; a competition game, which models the price competition between the MNO and the MVNO; and a subscription game, which models the subscription choice by the mobile users, and the outcome of which may be either not to subscribe, to subscribe to the MNO or to subscribe to the MVNO. The game is solved through backward induction, and each level has a specific solution concept: Shapley value, for the bargain; Nash equilibrium, for the competition; and Wardrop equilibrium, for the subscription. The paper assesses which conditions lead to an equilibrium where the competition does take place, which are expressed as restrictions for the spectrum leasing price agreed at the bargaining, and the spectrum efficiency improvement achieved by the MVNO. Furthermore, it argues that the amount of the leased spectrum should be fixed exogenously in order to achieve optimal user and social welfares.This work has been supported by Euro-NF Network of Excellence for all authors, the Spanish Government through projects TIN2010-21378-C02-02 and TIN2008-06739-C04-02 for the Spanish authors and the French research agency through the CAPTURES project for the French authors.Guijarro, L.; Pla, V.; Tuffin, B.; Maillé, P.; Vidal Catalá, JR. (2011). Competition and bargaining in wireless networks with spectrum leasing. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). 1-6. https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCOM.2011.6133605S1

Entry, competition and regulation in cognitive radio scenarios: a simple game theory model

[EN] Spectrum management based on private commons is argued to be a realistic scenario for cognitive radio deployment within the current mobile market structure. A scenario is proposed where a secondary entrant operator leases spectrum from a primary incumbent operator. The secondary operator innovates incorporating cognitive radio technology, and it competes in quality of service and price against the primary operator in order to provide service to users. We aim to assess which benefit users get from the entry of secondary operators in the market. A game theory-based model for analyzing both the competition between operators and the subscription decision by users is proposed. We conclude that an entrant operator adopting an innovative technology is better off entering the market, and that a regulatory authority should intervene first allowing the entrant operator to enter the market and then setting a maximum amount of spectrum leased. This regulatory intervention is justified in terms of users utility and social welfare.This work was supported by Spanish government through project TIN2010-21378-C02-02.Guijarro Coloma, LA.; Pla, V.; Vidal Catalá, JR.; Martínez Bauset, J. (2012). Entry, competition and regulation in cognitive radio scenarios: a simple game theory model. Mathematical Problems in Engineering. 1-13. https://doi.org/10.1155/2012/620972S11